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I. Introduction 
 
Knowledge has always represented a sort of human unrealizable dream and 
omniscience, that means the complete and unlimited knowledge, is considered by most of the 
cultures as a divine characteristic. To know means to have the power: in human history – and 
in recent philosophical reflections – it is a full stop! 
But what are we willing to give to get access to knowledge? Myths and stories on 
knowledge research tell of long trips and of supreme sacrifices.  
In the portrayals of Odin, the father of the gods in the Scandinavian tradition, he is 
often represented with a single eye1. One of the several changing Nordic legends tells that, in 
order to satisfy his thirst for knowledge, the god sacrificed his eye to Mimir, the 
Mimirsbrønd’s keeper, the magic fountain of wisdom placed on Yggrdrasil’s roots2. Since 
then, the divine eye is situated in the icy water of the fountain, as the price paid to acquire the 
eyes of the sage and to discern the essence of things, behind the appearance. 
This is the price paid by Odin. But what are we willing to pay? Or rather: are we really 
aware of the cost of our access to knowledge, particularly in the digital context and despite 
the outward gratuitousness of the provided service? I will try to give an answer to these 
questions in the following pages. 
In the first part I will focus on the issues linked to utilization of Digital Rights 
Management systems (DRM), suited to regulate the fruition of intellectual works protected by 
intellectual property rules, with specific reference to users’ privacy in its different 
dimensions; then, always from a privacy oriented point of view, I will outline the problematic 
aspects that open access to knowledge presents; I will analyze a paradigmatic example of free 
of charge service that poses monstrous risks from the point of view of users profiling activity. 
At the end, in order to pull the strings of the matter together and to take back the cues offered 
by Odin’s saga, I will develop some final reflections on the relationship between privacy and 
knowledge in the digital context. 
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II. Intellectual property, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and Privacy 
 
The advent of digital technologies gave rise to two phenomena: on the one hand, we 
register a heightening of the rigid and concentrated control (i.e. the DRM systems), based on 
commercial rules; on the other hand, we have the coming of new ways to fruitions focused on 
open access rules. 
I will concentrate on the hidden “price” that the user pays to get access to digital 
intellectual works, whether in the platforms that incorporate values and rules of the 
intellectual property, or in the architectures inspired by openness (I will analyse this issue in 
the next paragraph). 
From a purely technological point of view, the information production model based on 
the information closure and the rigid and concentrated control of it is implemented through 
DRM systems3. This term singles out the most advanced anti-access and anti-copy protection 
system on the market. The heart of every DRM is constituted by two modules. On the one 
hand, the so called “content-module”, that contains the digitalized data (text or audio files) 
“secured” through a cryptography process and ready to be distributed; before it happens, the 
name of the author, the copyright owner, the creation date, the title, the format, the dimension, 
and other technical information in order to identify the file (i.e. the ISBN) are incorporated 
into the content. On the other hand, the “licensing-module” generates the digital license that 
guarantees to the final user the access to the contents in the light of the usage rights of 
business rules. These determine the “what”, that means the precise piece of content to be 
used, and the “when”, that means to link particular features to every right: the type of user 
authorized to assert the “right”, the extension of every right (duration or numbers of permitted 
utilizations), and the price in order to assert the right. 
Let’s see an example so as to understand how this mechanism works4. Suppose I wish 
to get access to the new publications of an on-line law journal. I registered myself giving my 
profile details to the portal that contains the journal: my data are saved in a database assigned 
to store information regarding the users’ identity inside the licensing-module. At the same 
moment, the system generates the usage rules that sets the type of utilization, the cost, and the 
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specific category of authorized users; then it puts all this information into the licensing-
module. Whenever I desire to read the latest publication, the DocuReader device contacts the 
content-module and a decrypted copy is sent to my computer. Now I am able to display what I 
was looking for, but every future access attempts will be denied. In order to get other 
accesses, I will have to take out a subscription that will enable me to get more displays, or 
greater usage margins. This is a simple example of how a DRM system works. 
The DRM system also presents functionalities that have a direct impact on user 
privacy5. It contains at least one of the following basic functions6:  
a. content access control; 
b. content usage control; 
c. content identification, content owners, and general condition of usage; 
d. authentication of identification data. 
Moreover, for its own particular peculiarities, a DRM system is able to monitor the 
content fruition and, in case it has been set in that way, it can “sanction” the behaviours that 
are not compliant with its rules, for instance disconnecting the access. 
  Looking through what a DRM can do, a privacy scholar immediately thinks of 
“profiling”7. Personal data of Internet users, consumers of intellectual works, and, more 
generally, their commercial interests symbolise a real treasure for people working on the Net. 
The possibility of monitoring the user activities does not only represent the way to control-
manage his digital content fruition in order to impose – and when it is supposed to be 
necessary to sanction – the behaviours allowed according to the license that regulates the 
usage rights; but it becomes also a way to commodify the profile itself: this profile can be 
used by the profiler to adopt a more effective marketing strategy (maybe through some 
advertising banners answering user interests) or becomes itself an exchanging good, when the 
information is sold to a third party. 
This kind of considerations makes us easily understand the real impact that these 
technologies have with respect to users privacy. Now I need to clarify what I mean by the 
term “privacy”. When you deal with the description of this concept, even more if you place 
yourself by the point of view of the relation between law and technology, you tell how from a 
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privacy intended as the “right to be let alone”, originating from the paper of great-renown of 
Warren and Brandeis8, we arrived to a meaning much more linked to the idea of control of 
personal data, thanks to digital technologies diffusion. And actually, when we say “privacy” 
referring to the provisions that regulate it, we immediately hasten to remember that we are 
talking of personal data, of data control, of information to data subject, etc.9. 
But now I would like to quote a more extensive concept of privacy. This kind of 
description of the concept allows us to better understand the real importance of privacy in the 
Net, its actual role, in a context in which more and more information, and the 
commodification of it, comes into the limelight. People personality itself is taken to small 
pieces that are personal data. These pieces, once you have reassembled them, sketch out the 
profile of a person in the digital context, his virtual identity. The control on these pieces of 
identity has more dangerous repercussions than we can imagine if we take into account a 
narrow interpretation of privacy, since it involves the life fundamental aspects of the person to 
whom the data are related. 
After all these expectations, I will describe which are these theories I was referring to. 
The consumption of intellectual works, intended as the fruition of work of the intellects and of 
other information, is directly linked to three fundamental dimensions of the concept of 
privacy: “spatial”, “informational”, and “decisional”10. 
The first dimension, the “spatial” one, concerns the physical space, and in particular 
the size of the area in which the solitude of a person is protected from external invasion: this 
kind of privacy corresponds to a particular idea that sociologists connect to the relation 
between the private and the public space. The dimension I am talking about is related to 
freedom from external nuances or, more generally, from every kind of source of disturbances 
coming from the outside. In the matter I am dealing with now, spatial privacy involves those 
spaces in which a person is at liberty to behave in such a way that would be considered 
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aberrant by the point of view of the dominant social norms or, more plainly, not normally 
used in public. 
The second dimension, “informational” privacy, regards the flow of personal 
information. More accurately, it relates to the individual control with respect to processing of 
his personal data. Therefore, it is directly linked to that conceptualization of privacy focused 
on the control and the regulation of personal data treatment. From the point of view that 
focuses on the impact of DRM systems, processed data are information regarding the 
intellectual consumption, acquired by means of the functionalities we saw typifying the 
technological protection measures. 
The third, and certainly most important, dimension of privacy is the “decisional” one: 
it concerns the choice, the freedom that must be recognized to every person in order to be able 
to take a decision without any kind of external conditioning. I wish to focus my attention on 
this dimension. 
The “decisional” privacy involves the essence itself of human being. The free will, the 
freedom of self-determination, ultimately the freedom to be a man. There is not law, if there is 
not free will, if there is not the possibility to choose, even if to be wrong. Therefore, the 
violation of this dimension straightforwardly affects the “capacity” to be a man. The 
monitoring activity, the awareness of being spied on, the consciousness that the context 
around us is unceasingly changing in the light of the profile that other people are designing to 
us, modify person’s behaviour. The famous Panopticon of Bentham was based on this idea11: 
the radiocentric form of the building and the appropriate architectural and technological 
contrivances, that enabled a single warden to watch all the prisoners at every moment, without 
the possibility for these to establish if they were actually controlled or not (this point reminds 
us dreadfully the monitoring on the Net), gave the inmates the sentiment of an invisible 
omniscience, influencing their behaviour and persuading them to not violate the rules. 
Therefore, the perception of being watched influences, and will influence, our 
intellectual consumption, in such a way that we probably are not yet able to clearly determine. 
Let’s go back to the example I was using to better understand the potential 
consequences of DRM systems with respect to privacy. 
Before the published content in the on-line law journal has been encrypted, a 
metadata, called “Digital Object Identifier” (DOI), is inserted into every section of all the 
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articles. The granularity level of this DOI (every article, every section, or every paragraph), 
that are unique for every type of content, is decided by the editor. The outcome of this process 
is the following: all crypted data in the content-module are directly linked to some “pieces” of 
identifier metadata, that will always remain in the content when this is subsequently 
distributed. Then, every time I wish to modify the content of the document I have asked to the 
system (for instance to open, display, print a specific section of the publication), the 
“ContentControl” application sends an information package to the licensing-module, inclusive 
of the DOI and of the details of the action carried on; the package will be stored in the 
“logging program”. Simply accessing to the licensing-module, the editor can compile 
aggregate statistics of the utilization of the contents or display the profile of a specific user 
combining the information stored in the logging program with data saved in the database 
suited to collate users personal information. 
 
III. “Free of charge” on-line information access services and privacy 
 
I will deal in this section with the other moon’s face: the Open Access world or, more 
in general, the open – and seemingly free of charge – access to the fruition of on-line 
information12. I will hold the “Google” search engine as a paradigmatic example, also in its 
versions of “Google Scholar” and “Google Book Search”13. I made this choice since it 
represents a model, among the most invasive ones in the Net, of personal data gathering and 
of users profiling. Obviously, many of the issues I am going to describe can be met in other 
portals that provide access to scientific knowledge, especially when they are provided by an 
authentication system. 
From a purely economic point of view, this scenario could seem as an ideal world, that 
is the world of the free of charge and completely open access to knowledge; unfortunately, it 
is actually hiding a dark side. Notwithstanding the outward idyll, also in this context we are 
paying, often completely unawares, a very expensive price. 
Google is one of the most evident examples of personal data collection and, more 
generally, of information related to users. Every day millions of people use this search engine, 
giving to it information regarding their interests, needs, desires, fears, etc.. 
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I want to begin with a starting remark: Google is recording every query and is 
connecting them to a given Internet Protocol address (IP). This sentence probably frightens, 
astounds, immediately makes us calling to mind all the queries we have done, fearful of “what 
did we ask to Google?”. 
Let’s proceed in order. From this point of view, privacy concerns personal data, the 
information that European Directive 95/46/EC (“on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data”) at article 2, lett. a, 
defines as relating to “an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”. Hence, in reverse order, 
information that cannot be connected with a specific person is not a privacy issue. Then, the 
question lies in the possibility to establish this connection. 
In the following part I will explain how the log files relating to our queries can be 
associated to our person (rectius, identity). 
First of all, it happens through the IP collection. These are numbers that identify 
unequivocally the devices connected to a single network; IPs can be statics, that means fixed, 
or dynamics, that means assigned each time by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to his 
subscribers depending on necessity. The IP address, that can be banally considered the 
equivalent of a street address or of a telephone number, is regarded a personal data according 
to art. 2 Directive 95/46/EC (and art. 4, Italian Data Protection Code)14. Even if Google is not 
able to match the IP address linked to the log file that contains the queries, to a certain user, 
the fact that the ISP has this kind of data and that the public authority could force him to 
communicate data relating to the subscribers makes the log files close to personal data. 
In the second place, to overtake the difficulty of profiling users caused by dynamic IP 
addresses, an open access service portal can use “cookies”: these mark the user browser (the 
application used for surfing in the Net) with some “unique identifying numbers”15. Actually 
these files, that are supposed to facilitate users in remembering their login data and queries at 
every connection to the same Web page, permit the search engine to recognize the user as a 
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“recurrent visitor” of the site and to collate the history list of his queries, even if he connects 
to the Net using different IPs16.  
Cookies in themselves cannot be considered personal data, since they identify a 
particular browser (rectius, a computer), rather than a user. The cookie can be imagined as a 
sort of label, as “7583co3948le24”, without any visible repercussion on privacy, but as it were 
stick on a personal data box of an anonymous person. If you could match a given cookie, 
linked to a log file, with the queries on the search engine, to a specific person, then again you 
would relapse into the personal data uncomfortable – at least for the profilers – hat. But also 
this obstacle can be bypassed: let’s see how. As everybody knows, in addition to the search 
engine, Google provides several additional services (from the e-mail account to the 
investment portfolio) that are subject to registration through credentials, as the real name or 
the e-mail address (the most obvious example is Gmail). At this point, Bob's your uncle: the 
user logs into the Internet, loads the search engine portal, in the meanwhile he introduces a 
query. Google uses the same cookie to identify the list of queries and the e-mail account: the 
cookie anonymity is once and for all lost, the missing name on the users’ interests log files 
box has now a name and a surname! 
In the end, a final possibility to collate personal data is left over: this time the only 
guilty party is the user himself, apart from every kind of tactics he could adopt to reduce the 
use and the identification of his cookies. We all have tried in our life to look for our name on 
Google or, in our specific case, to search for our essays on a scientific database, maybe 
repeatedly in the same year17. These queries are called “ego searches” or “vanity searches”. 
They allow the profiler to link the information relating to users interests to a certain identity. 
Now let’s put another question to ourselves: where do the log files containing all these 
information on our queries go to? 
In the Google privacy policy we find innocently stated: “We use cookies to improve 
the quality of our service by storing user preferences and tracking user trends, such as how 
people search. Most browsers are initially set up to accept cookies, but you can reset your 
browser to refuse all cookies or to indicate when a cookie is being sent. However, some 
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Google features and services may not function properly if your cookies are disabled”18. Thus, 
the declaimed reason lies in the wish to improve the quality of the service! What’s a pity if we 
understand that in the meanwhile Google is starting the most extended and unprecedented in 
human history “Database of Intentions”: “the aggregate results of every search ever entered, 
every result list ever tendered, and every path taken as a result”19. Incentives to maintain this 
huge amount of information are represented by: the relatively low gathering and maintaining 
costs, the lack of a unique and clear regulation on this issues (this even more in the US legal 
system), and the very remunerative potential utilization of information. 
The Database of Intentions symbolizes also a very valuable good, a sort of goldmine if 
we take into account the economic value of information contained, that are a great temptation 
for many people: national security agencies, hackers, identity thieves, etc.. Just now, the 
search engine provider are not allowed (or should not be allowed) to sell personal data to third 
person. Hereafter it does not mean that it is not going to be allowed in the future, they 
exchange user data with subsidiary companies or other trusted business partners, in order to 
process this information and to provide services20.    
However that may be, there is always a third part with respect to data processing that 
could try to obtain personal data communication from the search engines, through a 
completely lawful procedure. I am referring to public authorities that could be interested in 
using log files for national security purposes. Especially after the tragic event of September 
11th, an in progress trend is modifying the way in which citizens consider the State and its 
tasks, and is gaining force, remarking the traditional role of public security guardian. At the 
beginning the State was remaining in the background in Internet regulation, but now it is more 
and more starting again to play a protagonist role, making strategic alliances with ISPs: these 
person are in possession of very precious information for prevention and contrasting activities 
against criminality. Then, we talk about “Invisible Handshake”21.  
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I took into account the Google example, but the same considerations could be 
developed for the scientific specialized portals that offer services of the same kind. Actually 
most of them require a prior necessary authentication in exchange for the download of full 
text materials proposed by the Web site (otherwise you are allowed to get only the abstract of 
the paper: see, as example, the Social Science Research Network (http://ssrn.com). 
 
IV. Conclusion: toward the overcoming of privacy vs. knowledge conflict 
 
At the end of the way I lead, let’s pull together the strings of what I said, trying to 
unveil, if it is not already clear, what the Odin saga has to do with our issue. 
Whether we are dealing with fruition of scientific knowledge under the proprietary 
schemes transposed in the digital context by DRM systems, or with free access to contents 
following the trend that brings to Open Access, we are losing (exchanging, if we were aware 
of that) our identity, our profile, our data in return for intellectual works we wish to enjoy. As 
it happened for Odin, we are handing over an eye, that means a very important part of our 
body, to Mimir, that is the holders of the knowledge we are so fervently seeking. Remaining 
on the same mythological example, other interesting – and at the same time appalling – 
similitudes occur to us. To drink by the magic fountain a gulp of knowledge we hand over an 
eye, and with that we are giving to other persons the possibility to see inside us through the 
given eye, to know what we think, what we desire, briefly speaking to appropriate our most 
hidden, and simultaneously most precious, part: our thoughts. 
Privacy is not only characterized by the tridimensional concept I described before 
(spatial, informational, decisional). It represents also a cultural phenomenon: everybody must 
be fully aware of the risks connected to an unlawful data processing and becoming themselves 
the first “security measures”, proper to avoid illegal utilization of data. Until Internet users 
understand the risks connected to the processing of their personal data and the real cost they 
pay to get access to the several services offered by the Net, they will always be dreadfully 
exposed to the monitoring of all those who, on the contrary, commodified exactly this 
awareness. 
Furthermore, we may had to say: scientific knowledge vs. privacy. And actually this 
conflict is manifest enough, I hope even more. But, if you really want to solve the contrast, 
you have to get over the traditional way to conceive the opposite poles. 
Privacy does not consist only in making some rules, some restrictions, after all some 
obstacles to data circulation; it must be declined in the correct management of the flows of 
data that marks out the information age in an ineliminable way. Knowledge, on the other 
hand, knows the already famous phenomenon of dematerialization that changes books, 
poems, music, drawings, into files expressed in binary code. Maybe it does not anymore make 
sense to conceive both terms of our subject in a physical way, carrying on a contrast that does 
not exist anymore in the digital context. It would be better to start reasoning on the fact that 
they can be considered as they are in the digital world, that is information, and thus 
reconsidering rules, technologies, and customs in the light of this new uniforming category 
that moves our attention to the management aspect of the exchanging flows, rather than to 
their inherent diversity. 
 
